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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-3043 
____________ 
 
MARCEL PINEDA-ROJAS, 
                            Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                              Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. A208-058-333) 
Immigration Judge:  Mirlande Tadal 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 11, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Marcel Pineda-Rojas, a native and citizen of 
Guatemala, removed from the country. Pineda-Rojas appealed that order to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his case, and now petitions us for review 
of the BIA’s dismissal order. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition in 
part and deny it in part. 
I. 
 Pineda-Rojas illegally entered the United States in 2001 and has remained here 
continuously since that time. In August 2015, he was convicted of cocaine possession and 
the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable from the country.  
In October, Pineda-Rojas appeared before an IJ. At his initial appearance, he 
conceded his removability but moved for a continuance of the removal proceeding. At the 
next listing of his removal proceedings, Pineda-Rojas requested relief from removal by 
applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  
The IJ scheduled a merits hearing in February 2016. At the hearing, Pineda-Rojas 
testified regarding his fear that he would be killed or targeted by a drug cartel if he 
returned to Guatemala. Personally, Pineda-Rojas testified, he had never dealt drugs. 
However, his brother and cousin were involved in a large drug cartel, his brother had 
tried to recruit him to sell drugs, and the police seized a cocaine package addressed to his 
cousin as it was being delivered to his home in 2015. Because he had not spoken with his 
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brother or cousin since 2009, he did not know who sent the drugs in 2015, but he 
suspected it was his brother, his cousin, or their cartel. Likewise, he did not know if 
anyone was looking for him, but he feared that the cartel would be angry about the drug 
seizure and either kill him for losing the drugs or torture him to find his brother or cousin.  
At the conclusion of the merits hearing, the IJ ordered Pineda-Rojas removed to 
Guatemala. The IJ found Pineda-Rojas’s asylum application untimely and then denied his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT on the 
merits because he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
his membership in a particular social group.  
In March, Pineda-Rojas appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA, in turn, 
upheld the IJ’s decision and dismissed his appeal. It agreed with Pineda-Rojas that his 
application for asylum was timely and that his family constituted a particular social 
group. But it found his CAT claim waived for his failure to appeal the IJ’s denial of CAT 
protection. And it denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal on the 
merits because he had not shown that his group was socially distinct in Guatemala; that 
he would be harmed on account of his familial relationship; or that he had a well-founded 
fear of future persecution. This timely petition for review followed. 
II. 
The IJ had jurisdiction over Pineda-Rojas’s removal proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a. The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 
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1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). When the BIA issues a 
decision on the merits, we review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject to the 
principles of deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 844 (1984).1 We review the BIA’s factual findings, including its determination 
of whether an alien has a well-founded fear of persecution, for substantial evidence.2 
Under substantial-evidence review, “we may reverse only if a reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”3  
III. 
On appeal, Pineda-Rojas raises three issues. First, Pineda-Rojas argues that the 
BIA and IJ erred in denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. 
Second, he argues that the IJ was biased against him. Third, he argues that the BIA and IJ 
erred in denying his application for CAT protection. Pineda-Rojas, however, did not raise 
a procedural due process or CAT claim in his BIA appeal—instead, his BIA appeal was 
limited to three challenges to the denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of 
removal. Because these two issues were neither presented to, nor addressed by, the BIA, 
                                              
1 Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010). 
2 Id.; see also Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2006).  
3 Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006) (brackets and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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they are unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to consider them.4 Thus we may only 
review the denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. 
A. 
To be eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), the asylum applicant 
bears the burden of establishing that he qualifies as a refugee by being “unable or 
unwilling to avail himself . . . of the protection of [his native country] because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”5 To obtain a withholding 
of removal, the applicant must make a similar showing but bears a heightened burden: the 
applicant must demonstrate a “clear probability of persecution”6 because of his “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”7  
Although Pineda-Rojas maintains that his testimony established that he has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of his membership in his family, we find no error 
in the BIA’s conclusion that he failed to demonstrate his eligibility for asylum or 
                                              
4 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (“A court may review a final order of removal only 
if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of 
right.”); Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“A petitioner’s failure to 
exhaust an issue by presenting it to the BIA deprives us of jurisdiction to consider that 
issue.”); Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 126 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing the BIA can 
exhaust an unpresented issue by addressing it sua sponte); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 
F.3d 587, 595 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] claim of IJ bias remains subject to administrative 
exhaustion requirements.”).  
5 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201-02 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
6 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
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withholding of removal. Whether or not his familial status constitutes a “particular social 
group” within the meaning of the Immigration Naturalization Act (“INA”), the statute 
also requires him to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution”8 and “a sufficient 
‘nexus’ between persecution and one of the listed protected grounds.”9 In its decision 
below, the BIA found that Pineda-Rojas could not establish a nexus between persecution 
and his familial status or a well-founded fear of persecution. And we agree with the 
government that substantial evidence supports those factual findings.  
During Pineda-Rojas’s testimony, he admitted that the central reason he feared 
retribution was because the cartel’s drugs were lost, not because he was a member of his 
family. In addition, he identified no past mistreatment in Guatemala and admitted that he 
did not know who sent the drugs or whether anyone in the cartel was looking for him. 
Finally, he testified that no one had threatened him for losing the drugs. Under our 
precedent, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for asylum, Pineda-Rojas’s 
stated fear of persecution is not enough—he must both show that “he has a subjective 
fear of persecution” and that his subjective fear “is supported by objective evidence that 
                                              
8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  
9 Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of 
[section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title], the applicant must establish that race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at 
least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”). 
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persecution is a reasonable possibility.”10 As the BIA properly concluded, his testimony 
was based solely on speculation and falls well short of satisfying that objective showing.  
Because Pineda-Rojas “has failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, 
he has failed to meet the higher standard of demonstrating a ‘clear probability’ of 
persecution and thus is also not eligible for withholding of removal.”11 Consequently, the 
BIA properly concluded that he is not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal.  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will dismiss Pineda-Rojas’s petition for review 
in part and deny it in part.  
                                              
10 Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 495-96 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
11 Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2007); Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y 
Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Because [the standard for withholding of 
removal] is higher than that governing eligibility for asylum, an alien who fails to qualify 
for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.”). 
